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Abstract
Although the use of multiple methods of user authentication for IT system increases security, passwords are often the only
credential required for access. Consequently, the challenge is to discover ways to improve password strength without impairing
usability. Longer pass “phrases” have received increased attention as a solution to this challenge because they are potentially
more resistant to attacks yet are easy to remember. Recent evidence, however, suggests that passphrases increase the likelihood
of typographical errors resulting in login failures and negative user perceptions. This paper presents experimental results that
demonstrate well-designed passphrases do not increase login failures and, thereby, generate positive user perceptions.
Implications are drawn to help IT managers develop effective IT security policies in utilizing passphrases to improve authentication
and to assist researchers in identifying avenues for future research.
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Effectiveness
1. Introduction
IT security could be enhanced by using multiple methods to authenticate users, such as combining
“something you know” (e.g., a password) with “something you have” (e.g., a smartcard or token) and
“something you are” (e.g., a biometric characteristic). Although the use of biometrics and smartcards
is growing, passwords are still the most common, and sometimes the only authentication mechanism
used by many organizations (Whitman, 2003). Therefore, it is important to find ways to improve
password effectiveness.
To be effective as an authentication mechanism, passwords must simultaneously satisfy two
conflicting requirements: they must be difficult to compromise, yet easy to remember. This challenge
underscores the importance of considering user behavior when developing security solutions. If users
are allowed to create their own passwords, they tend to use common words, names, dates, or other
personal information that can be easily remembered (Brown et al., 2004). Such passwords, however,
can also be easily guessed by attackers with knowledge about their intended victim. In addition, usergenerated passwords are often easy to compromise by various types of permutation attacks that use
pre-compiled dictionaries or word-lists (Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2005). If organizations attempt to
mitigate this threat either by developing strict guidelines for creating passwords or by assigning users
system-generated passwords that are comprised of random characters, users can find such complex
passwords difficult to remember (Yan et al., 2004). Therefore, they often write the password down and
store it insecurely (e.g., by attaching it to the monitor or placing it under the keyboard). Even if users
store the written-down password securely (e.g., in their wallets), doing so changes it from being
“something you know” to “something you have,” thereby reducing the number of different
authentication factors being used.
Switching from passwords to passphrases may provide a solution to this security vs. “memorability”
predicament. Passphrases are long passwords created from multiple words to form a phrase (e.g., “I
love to eat chocolate chip cookies”). The idea of using passphrases is not new (cf Porter, 1982), but
until recently most systems have restricted password length to eight characters, making the use of
longer passphrases infeasible. Now, many online authentication schemes and newer versions of both
Windows and Mac operating systems support the use of much longer passwords, and security
professionals recommend replacing passwords with passphrases (Burnett, 2005; Center for Internet
Security, 2004, Section 2.2.2.4; Johansson and Riley, 2005, p. 345; Skoudis and Liston, 2006, p.
402). Passphrases are attractive because there is evidence that they are as easy to remember as
user-generated passwords (Keith et al., 2007; Yan et al., 2004), yet are potentially more resistant to
compromise than system-generated passwords (Burnett, 2005; Johansson, 2004c). Passphrases
also increase the effectiveness of behavioral biometric tools like keystroke analysis in distinguishing
between different people entering the same data (Huston, 2006). Thus, passphrases may not only be
inherently more secure than passwords, but may also improve the joint level of security when used as
part of a multi-factor authentication scheme.
Recent research, however, reveals a potential drawback to passphrases: increased typographic
errors (Keith et al., 2007). Such errors not only result in more login failures but also negatively affect
such user perceptions as ease-of-use. User perceptions are important because they can influence
willingness to comply with the organization’s security policies. If users decide not to comply with
security policies that are perceived as being onerous and counterproductive, the overall level of
security declines. Therefore, it is important to investigate whether switching from passwords to
passphrases merely replaces one trade-off between security and usability with another.
This study reports the results of a 12-week field experiment that investigated whether passphrases
can be constructed in a manner that makes them both more effective and easier to use than strong
passwords. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the
theoretical foundation for our research design and develops our hypotheses. Then we describe our
research methodology and the experimental task, and present our results. We discuss the
implications of those results, including the limitations of the study, before we conclude this paper.
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2. Literature Review and Hypotheses
Prior research on passwords has primarily focused on technical issues, particularly how the
characteristics of the “something you know” credential affect its strength and ease of recall (e.g.,
Morris and Thompson, 1979; Pond et al., 2000; Wiedenbeck et al., 2005, Zviran and Haga, 1990).
Password strength refers to its resistance to both guessing and “cracking” attacks. Guessing attacks
are online: The perpetrator tries repeatedly to log in to the target account by trying various passwords.
The likelihood of an attacker successfully guessing a user’s password can be significantly reduced by
enforcing policies about minimum password length, required frequency of changing, and the
maximum number of attempted logins permitted before the account is locked. Proper policies,
combined with periodic examination of logs to identify excessive failed attempts to log in to specific
accounts, should make guessing attacks unlikely to succeed (Johansson and Riley, 2005, p. 327).
On the other hand, password cracking involves stealing a copy of the encrypted or hashed password
file, or capturing the challenge-response sequence, and attempting to create strings that match the
captured credentials (Johansson, 2004a).1 Precompiled hash files exist for words in almost every
language; therefore, “cracking” any password that is contained in such a list is a relatively trivial task.
Such dictionary attacks can be thwarted, however, by “salting” passwords with additional random text
prior to hashing. Salted passwords and passwords comprised of random sequences of characters
can only be cracked by brute force enumeration of every possible combination of allowable
characters. Password strength, in terms of resistance to such brute force enumeration attacks, is a
function of the size of the search space, which can be calculated by the formula nL, where n
represents the size of the allowable character set that is used to create the password (or passphrase)
and L represents its length. Thus, increasing the length L of a password/passphrase exponentially
increases the size of the search space. If the distribution of passwords or passphrases within the
potential search space is uniform, attackers would need to enumerate, on average, one-half of the
possibilities to successfully guess the login credential.
This nL formula suggests that longer passphrases should be much stronger than fixed-length systemgenerated random passwords. The formula, however, assumes that each character is randomly
chosen with equal probability. This assumption is not likely to hold for user-generated passwords and
passphrases. For example, because passphrases consist of words, there are certain patterns of letter
sequences (e.g., in English the letter q is almost certain to be followed by the letter u, sequences of
three or more consecutive vowels are highly unlikely, etc.). As such, entropy is a better measure of
password strength than simple length and character set, because it also takes into account the
probability with which each individual character is chosen (Johansson, 2004b). Entropy is a measure
of the randomness of a password; the more random the sequence of characters, the higher the
entropy of a password and the more resistant it is to cracking. There is no universal agreement on
how to calculate the entropy of user-generated passwords and passphrases. Nevertheless, even
conservative calculations indicate that well-designed passphrases are likely to have higher entropy
(i.e., be more resistant to brute-force guessing attacks) than eight-character system-generated
passwords that represent truly random sequences of symbols2 (Johansson, 2004b; Johansson,
2004c).
The nL formula may also have to be adjusted for passphrases to reflect the fact that the relevant unit

1

Theft of the password hash file means that the attacker has already compromised at least one machine. Cracking
the password file enables the attacker to continue to access the system in a manner that is difficult to track (i.e., by
logging in as a legitimate user). In addition, because users often use the same credential on multiple systems,
cracking passwords on one system may enable attackers to successfully jump to other targets.
2
For example, a common measure of entropy is log (base 2) of character set size (Johansson, 2004b). Passphrases
consisting of 26 alphabetic characters plus the following 13 special characters enclosed in brackets [.,;:?”’()-!$%] and
the space bar total 40 potential characters resulting in 5.3 bits of entropy per character (log(base2) of 40). Hence, a
three-word (approx. 16 characters) passphrase consisting of the above 40 characters has about 84.8 bits of entropy
(16 characters x 5.3 bits). In comparison, a completely random password has 6.6 bits of entropy per character
(log(base2) of 95 possible characters). Therefore, an eight-character random password has only 52.8 bits of entropy
(8 characters x 6.6 bits) compared to 84.8 for a passphrase.
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of analysis is words, rather than characters.3 Thus for passphrases, the character set size n is the
size of the average user’s vocabulary and L is the number of words used in the passphrase.
Estimates of the size of an average adult’s vocabulary vary dramatically, ranging from a few thousand
to more than 50,000 words (Crystal, 2003; Wren, 2003). As was the case with entropy, however, even
the most conservative estimates of vocabulary size indicate an advantage for passphrases over
random system-generated passwords that contain a mix of alphanumeric and special characters. For
example, a five-word passphrase drawn from a conservative vocabulary set of 3,000 words is more
resistant to brute-force enumeration than an eight-character random system-generated password,
and an eight-word passphrase is as strong as a 14-character random system-generated password.
However, technology and behavior are inseparable in information systems (Hevner et al., 2004).
Password security is, thus, as much a behavioral issue as a technical one. Users adapt their
behaviors to requirements imposed by a system, and they also attempt to modify or alter aspects of
the system in order to make it easier to use (DeSanctis and Poole, 1994). The resulting “technology
in practice” (Orlikowsky, 2000) may be quite different from what the system designer intended and
may lead to counterintuitive results (Gray and Durcikova, 2005-6). Consider the situation where
organizations permit users to create their own passwords and provide explicit guidance for
developing strong passwords. Such guidance typically includes requirements to use multiple types of
characters, to not use words from the dictionary, and to exceed some minimum length. If
organizations do not monitor or enforce compliance with those guidelines, users tend to ignore them
and create weak passwords (Zviran and Haga, 1999). If organizations employ password-checking
programs (Ruffo and Bergadeno, 2005) to monitor and enforce compliance with password guidelines,
users may resort to behaviors that satisfy the “letter” but not the “spirit” of those rules. For example,
users may create passwords like !QAZxsw2 or pa$$W0rd. Although both examples appear to satisfy
typical complexity requirements (i.e., they are case-sensitive and contain both numbers and special
characters), each may be included in some precompiled dictionaries (the former because it consists
of a predictable pattern based on the keyboard layout and the latter because it is a regular word,
albeit with special characters replacing normal letters). Another undesirable user behavior is the
propensity to use the same password on multiple systems (Ives et al., 2004; Johansson & Riley,
2005). This creates what is referred to as a “security dependency” or “domino effect” in which
compromising a weak system provides attackers with authentication credentials for access to other
more secure systems.
Besides the act of generating a password, using the password during regular logins also takes on an
adaptive structure. Password authentication systems are designed to restrict access to only those
people who correctly enter a username and a password. The underlying assumption is that legitimate
authorized users can successfully meet these requirements. Users, however, often make
typographical errors or may even forget their passwords altogether. Many systems are designed to
lock users out after a certain number of failed attempts (usually three to five). Such lockouts not only
result in extra time and cost spent resolving these problems, but are also likely to cause users to alter
their behaviors to avoid future problems. For example, if users have difficulty remembering a complex
password, they may write it down. Alternatively, to avoid typing errors, users may store their password
or passphrase electronically so that they can simply copy and paste it when authenticating
themselves to a system. Both responses transform the authentication credential from “something you
know” to “something you have,” with concomitant unfavorable changes in the effective level of
security provided.
The preceding examples illustrate how user behaviors can cause the actual level of security provided
by a specific authentication credential to be much lower than the analysis of its technical
specifications would predict. They also underscore the need to consider user experience with and
perceptions about authentication mechanisms. If users have negative perceptions about a system,
they are less likely to use it voluntarily; or if use is mandatory, users are likely to circumvent or modify
features that are perceived as too burdensome (Ives et al., 1983; Mahmood et al., 2000; McKeen et
al., 1994). Thus, the difficulty of use (in the form of login failure rate, for example) is likely to be
3

We thank an anonymous reviewer for calling attention to the need for this adjustment in unit of analysis to words.

Journal of the Association for Information Systems

Vol. 10 Issue 2 pp. 63-89 February 2009

66

Keith et al./Passphrase Usability and Effectiveness

directly associated with user attempts to modify the implementation of an authentication mechanism.
Consequently, when deciding whether to replace passwords with passphrases, system designers and
security administrators should consider the relative propensity of each technique to cause login
failures.

Login Credential

Overall Login Failure

H1

Ease of Use
Memory Error

Passphrase vs.
Password
(length, source, and
complexity)

User Perceptions

H3

H2

Typographical
Error

H4

Intent to Adopt

Usefulness

Figure 1. Theoretical model of login failure, user perceptions, and intentions
Login failures by legitimate authorized users can be due to either forgetting the login credential or
making typographical errors when entering it. Therefore, the relative effectiveness of passwords and
passphrases depends, in part, on how easy it is to both remember and successfully enter each type
of credential. Figure 1 displays the theoretical relationships between password characteristics and
login failure as well as between login failure and the subsequent user perceptions and intentions. The
following sections discuss these relationships and constructs in greater detail.

2.1. Memory-related Issues with Authentication Credentials
In order to truly be an authentication credential that is “something you know,” passwords or
passphrases must be memorized and not written down. One important factor affecting memorization
is the ability to retain the to-be-learned information in short-term (or “working”) memory long enough
to transfer it to long-term memory (Anderson, 2005; Driscoll, 2005, p. 86-87). This transfer depends
upon the relationship between the amount of information to be learned and the storage capacity of
short-term memory. Initially, short-term memory was estimated as being capable of holding between
five to nine “chunks” of information (Miller, 1956), but more recent studies suggest that the effective
optimal size is actually three to five “chunks” of information (Cowan, 2001; Doumont, 2002). However,
this is not as stringent a limitation as it may seem because a chunk of information need not be limited
to a single character or number, but may instead be any meaningful set of related items (Simon,
1974, p. 482). Thus, both a single word like “baseball” and a phrase like “roses are red, violets are
blue” may each be treated as one chunk of information, even though the former consists of eight and
the latter of 31 characters. Consistent with this chunking theory, prior research has indeed found that
passphrases are as easy to remember as user-generated passwords (Keith et al., 2007; Zviran and
Haga, 1993).
Because of the ease of cracking passwords based on common words, most organizations require
user-generated passwords to consist of a mixture of alphanumeric and special characters. To
facilitate memorization, users often create passwords like “$3Cur!ty” that appear to be random
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sequences of symbols but in reality are still based on words that can be easily remembered (e.g., by
substituting the characters $, 3, and ! for the letters s, e, and i in the word “security”). Such memoryenabling artifices, however, are also known to attackers and can be used to simplify what would
otherwise be brute-force guessing. Consequently, some organizations mandate the use of systemgenerated passwords that consist of truly random sequences of characters. Although such passwords
(e.g., “8Wk$nP3!”) may be harder to guess or crack, they are also much more difficult to memorize
because each character will be treated as a separate chunk of information.
Users must both memorize their authentication credentials and be able to recall them correctly when
attempting to access the system. People can better remember meaningful words and non-words if
they generated those items themselves as opposed to merely read them (Cameron et al., 2005;
Jacoby, 1978; Johns and Swanson, 1988; Slamecka and Graf, 1978). This so-called generation effect
suggests that it should be easier for users to recall self-generated passwords or passphrases than
system-generated passwords.
There is reason to suspect, however, that self-generated passwords and passphrases may
themselves differ in ease of recall. People often attempt to use the same or slightly modified
passwords on different systems in order to reduce the number of different passwords they need to
remember (Ives et al., 2004). For example, if different systems impose different requirements (e.g.,
length, use of special characters, etc.), users may simply modify a password they already use on a
system with less stringent requirements (e.g., replacing the letter “I” with the number “1”). Yet, a
robust finding in memory research, referred to as the “phonological similarity effect” (PSE) (Baddeley,
1966; Conrad, 1964; Lian et al., 2001), suggests that sets of phonologically similar words are more
difficult to distinguish and recall than dissimilar words. Thus, although it may be easier to generate
new passwords that are similar to other passwords, doing so likely makes it more difficult for users to
recall the correct password later when attempting to authenticate to a particular system. Currently,
few systems require the use of passphrases. As a consequence, passphrases should be quite
dissimilar to passwords used to access other systems and, therefore, should be easier to recall.
The preceding discussion leads to the following hypotheses:
H1a: Users of passphrases will experience fewer login failures due to memory errors than will
users of either self-generated passwords or system-generated random passwords.
H1b: Users of self-generated passwords will experience fewer login failures due to memory
errors than will users of system-generated random passwords.

2.2. Typing-related Issues with Authentication Credentials
People may correctly remember their password or passphrase, but still make a typographical error
when entering it. This problem is aggravated by the design of human-computer login interface, which
masks the characters being entered to prevent “over-the-shoulder” password discovery. As a result,
users do not have the ability to “recognize” that they have made a mistake and to correct it
immediately (as they can do when using a word processing program). On the contrary, they only
receive feedback (in the form of a login failure) after they finish entering an invalid password.
Typing is a process that involves four stages (Salthouse, 1986): 1) the input stage where text is
converted in memory into chunks, 2) the parsing stage where the chunks are decomposed into strings
of characters, 3) the translation stage where characters are converted in memory to specific finger
movements, and 4) the execution stage where the key presses are carried out. Although errors can
occur at any one of these stages (Salthouse, 1986), the latter two are most likely to produce “typos”
when entering login credentials. The most common problems include substitution errors, which occur
by accidentally striking a nearby key instead of the correct one; temporal errors, which involve
transposing correct letters; and execution errors that arise from entering too few or too many
keystrokes (Logan, 1999).
The probability of making a typing error increases with the amount of material being entered. Thus,
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one might expect that passphrases, because of their increased length, should result in more typing
errors than short passwords. Indeed, Keith et al. (2007) report that user-created passphrases were
more than twice as long as user-generated passwords and resulted in significantly more login failures
due to typing errors.
Length, however, is only one of many factors that can cause typing errors. It has been argued that
because of the many potential error factors affecting each key press, “the challenge is more one of
explaining accuracy rather than errors” (Logan, 1999, p. 1769). One such explanation is offered by
Rieger (2004), who argues that typists can develop “automatic activation” for common words and
phrases—meaning that actions can become so learned that the translation stage (that of converting
letters into keystrokes) can require almost no effort. In other words, typing patterns that have become
well-learned will result in higher speeds and greater accuracy due to the strengthening of cognitive
information processing pathways4 during training (Cohen et al., 1990; John, 1996; Rumelhart and
Norman, 1982). This argument has significant implications for the design of passphrases and
passwords. Nowadays, most users have considerable word processing experience. Therefore,
familiar sequences of characters that consist of commonly typed words and that use typical spelling
and punctuation should be typed much more quickly and accurately than unusual sequences of
characters that include numbers and special characters. Consequently, security practitioners have
argued that it is easier to type passphrases than complex passwords that consist of not only
alphanumeric but also special characters (cf Skoudis and Liston, 2006, p. 402). For example, users
should make fewer typing errors when entering the word “scooter” than when typing “Sc00ter” or
“$c00t3r” because the former conforms to normal spelling conventions used when typing a text
document. We will refer to typing passwords and passphrases consistent with the contents of normal
text documents as being in “word processing mode” (WPM).
Users are likely to enter into WPM when typing a passphrase because the credential is a sentence or
sentence fragment. Consequently, passphrases that are similar in structure to what would be typed in
a word processing document should be easier to type correctly than those that violate normal word
processing rules, because the former represent a well-learned skill. For example, when numbers are
included in a passphrase, they are less likely to result in typing errors if they are used as dates or
ages than if they are appended to or mixed into the words that comprise the passphrase (e.g.,
passphrases like “In 1492 Columbus sailed the ocean blue” or “Bill Jones is 23” should result in fewer
typing errors than passphrases like “Th1s is my s3cr3t passphrase” or “Once upon a time3”). The use
of spaces to separate words is also more consistent with WPM and, therefore, should result in fewer
typing errors than attempting to enter the same phrase either without any spaces or using the
underscore character to separate words.
Lack of conformity to WPM may explain Keith et al.’s (2007) finding that passphrases increased the
number of login failures due to typing errors. In their study, users who were assigned to the
passphrase condition were required to create credentials that were case sensitive and that contained
at least one non-letter. Our examination of the credentials created by their subjects reveals that most
participants did not create phrases consistent with WPM. Instead, they either did not use spaces or
used a special character, such as the underscore, to separate the words in the phrase. Therefore,
Keith et al.’s (2007) finding that passphrases result in more typing errors may not represent an
inherent problem with passphrases but, rather, may simply reflect problems associated with creating
passphrases that are inconsistent with WPM. If people create passphrases that follow normal word
processing conventions, their well-developed word processing skill should offset the increased length
and may even make such passphrases less prone to typing errors than user-generated passwords
comprised of a non-WPM sequence of alphanumeric characters. This leads to the following
hypotheses:
H2a: Users who create passphrases that conform to word processing mode (WPM) will
4

The term “processing pathways” refers to the pattern of cognitive activities that comprise human actions. For
example, finger movements occur “via a set of connected modules that form a pathway” (Cohen et al., 1990, p. 335)
through the brain. The speed and accuracy at which the finger moves depends on the “strength” of the pathway.
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experience fewer typing errors than will users of either system- or self-generated
passwords.
H2b: Users who create passphrases that conform to WPM will experience fewer typing errors
than will users who create passphrases that are not consistent with WPM.
H2c: Users of system-generated random passwords will experience more typing errors than will
users who generate their own passwords.

2.3. User Perceptions of Alternative Authentication Credentials
In general, people prefer to minimize effort when using systems, provided then achieve an acceptable
level of accuracy (Todd and Benbasat, 1994; 1999; 2000). At first glance, it would appear that it takes
more effort to use passphrases than either user-generated or system-generated passwords because
they are longer and require more keystrokes to enter. However, the preceding sections have
presented reasons to believe that passphrases may be easier to remember and less prone to typing
errors than either user-generated or system-generated passwords. Thus, passphrases may actually
require less effort to use successfully than either user-generated or system-generated passwords.
Moreover, according to the technology acceptance model (Davis, 1989; Adam et al., 1992; Venkatesh
and Davis, 2000; Wixom and Todd, 2005), if users cannot successfully log in either because they
make a typographic error or because they forget their password, they are likely to form negative
perceptions about the “ease of use” and “usefulness” of that credential, and be less satisfied overall.
Both typing and memory errors are expected to create similar negative perceptions, because the
design of the login interface only provides feedback that the login attempt was unsuccessful, but does
not indicate the cause for the login failure. Indeed, the two types of errors can become intertwined
and hard for users to distinguish. If users experience repeated login failures due to typing errors, they
may question whether they remember the correct password for that system. If they then enter a
different password, they will experience additional login failures, thereby further exacerbating their
perceived ease of use and usefulness about the login credential being used. Hence, the overall login
failure rate, rather than the cause of the login failure, is likely to determine user perceptions. The
more frequently users encounter problems when using a credential to attempt to login, the more
negative their perceptions are likely to become. As a result of negative perceptions, they will have
lower intentions to voluntarily adopt that credential for future use. This leads to the following
hypotheses:
H3:
H4:

Overall login failure rates will be inversely related to perceptions about the ease-of-use and
usefulness of login credentials.
User perceptions about the ease-of-use and usefulness of a login credential increase their
intentions to voluntarily adopt this type of credential for future use.

Table 1 summarizes the variables of interest and how they relate to our hypotheses.

3. Methodology
3.1. Participants and Task
We conducted a longitudinal field study to test our hypotheses. Undergraduate students from a large
public university who were enrolled in an elective course on web development offered by the school
of business participated in the experiment. Course instructors used a class website to provide
resources and materials for web design. The site contained a restricted section where assignments,
materials, and tutorials could be accessed only via username and password. Before classes began, a
database was generated containing each student’s university-assigned username. Next, each
username was randomly assigned to one of three groups for password generation requirements: 1)
Standard, user-generated passwords at least eight characters long and containing one or more nonletters, 2) Random, system-generated passwords that were eight characters long and created from
the 95-character base FIPS standard (1985), and 3) User-generated passphrases at least 16
characters long. Hereafter, we refer to these as the standard, random, and passphrase groups,
respectively.
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Table 1. Theory, Variables, and Hypotheses about Password and Passphrase Use
Theory

71

Explanation

Variable(s)

Hypotheses

“Chunking”
The ability to “chunk” information Memory(Cowan, 2001; makes related letters and words based login
Miller, 1956)
easier to remember. Therefore, failures
passphrases and user-generated
passwords that can be represented
as one chunk are easier to
remember than system-generated
passwords, because each random
character is likely to be treated as a
separate chunk.

H1a: Users of passphrases will
experience fewer login failures due
to memory errors than will users of
system-generated
random
passwords.

Phonological
Similarity
Effect
(Baddeley,
1966; Conrad,
1964; Lian et
al., 2001)

Multiple “orthogonal” words are Memoryeasier to remember at once than based login
highly similar words. Therefore, failures
multiple
passwords
and
passphrases
are
easier
to
remember if they are more different
from others in memory. Because
passphrases are seldom used at
the present time, they should differ
markedly from any passwords
previously used and, therefore,
should be easier to remember than
self-generated passwords.

H1a: Users of passphrases will
experience fewer login failures due
to memory errors than will users of
self-generated passwords.

Skilled
Typing
(Rumelhart
and Norman,
1982;
Salthouse,
1986)

Those characters that are less
commonly
typed
in
word
processing (e.g., numbers and nonalphanumeric characters) are less
automatic in terms of motor skills.
As more of these unusual
characters are used, passwords
and passphrases become more
difficult to type correctly.

Typographicalbased login
failures

H2a:
Users
who
create
passphrases that conform to word
processing mode (WPM) will
experience fewer typing errors than
will users of either system- or selfgenerated passwords.
H2b:
Users
who
create
passphrases that conform to WPM
will experience fewer typing errors
than will users who create
passphrases that are not consistent
with WPM.
H2c: Users of system-generated
random passwords will experience
more typing errors than will users
who generate their own passwords.

User
Perceptions
and
Technology
Acceptance
(Davis, 1989;
Venkatesh and
Davis, 2000;
Wixom
and
Todd, 2005)

User experiences with login
credentials
determine
their
subsequent perceptions. In the
text-based authentication context,
these measures are based upon
the user’s rate of login failure,
which is a function of the rates of
both memory- and typographicallybased errors.

Perceived
usefulness,
perceived
ease-ofuse, intent
to adopt

H3: Overall login failure rates will be
inversely related to perceptions
about
the
ease-of-use
and
usefulness of login credentials.

Journal of the Association for Information Systems

H1b: Users of self-generated
passwords will experience fewer
login failures due to memory errors
than will users of system-generated
random passwords.

H4: User perceptions about the
ease-of-use and usefulness of a
login credential increase their
intentions to voluntarily adopt this
type of credential for future use.
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In the first class, each participant accessed the course’s website registration page and entered his or
her university username. Depending on the group to which they were randomly assigned, participants
then received one of three different sets of instructions. The interfaces for each group were identical
except for the instructions about the nature of the login credential that would be used to access the
materials on the course website. Participants assigned to the standard group were asked to generate
a password that was at least eight characters long and contained at least one non-letter. Participants
assigned to the random group were asked to provide an email address where they would have their
password sent to them. Participants assigned to the passphrase group were asked to generate a
password based on a three- to five-word phrase at least 16 characters long.5 Website functionality
was built in to ensure that the standard and passphrase participants met length and character
requirements. In addition, participants assigned to the passphrase and standard password groups
saw a pop-up window that reminded them not to create a login credential that was similar to one they
used on any other system.
The course included eight homework assignments that could only be obtained by logging into the
website. These assignments were given at a rate of one per week, leaving six weeks with no login
requirement toward the semester’s end. During those last six weeks, participants could continue to
log in to the website to retrieve missed assignments, download lecture slides, and obtain web
development resources. Every time a participant attempted to log in, the website application recorded
the username, login credential entered, timestamp, and outcome (success or failure). Participants
who forgot their passwords had to personally contact the instructor, who then verbally provided them
with their password. If participants needed a password reminder outside of class hours, they were told
to call the instructor at a specified phone number or send an email with a phone number at which the
instructor would call them back.

3.2. Measures
Login Failure and Error
The overall login failure rate, failures due to memory errors, and failures due to typing errors were
calculated for each individual. Rates of failures were used rather than totals in order to normalize the
varying numbers of individuals’ login attempts (i.e., participants who have more login failures will
naturally have higher login totals). Distinguishing between memory-errors and typing-errors was
accomplished using a hybrid of objective measures and subjective judgments as described below.
Keith et al. (2007) used a formula known as the “Levenshtein” (L) distance (Levenshtein, 1966) to
distinguish typo- from memory-related errors. The resulting L-score is a measure of the difference in
the characters between two strings. For example, entering “paswword” instead of “password” results
in an L-score of 1. The algorithm also accounts for difference in string lengths, so that when
compared to the correct word “password” both “password," and “passwords” have an L-score of 1.
Incorrectly typing one character results in an L-score of 1. Thus, it is tempting to classify any login
failure with an L-score of 1 as a typographical error, and any login failure with an L-score greater than
1 as a memory problem. Although objective, such a rule is inadequate, because it does not take into
account the context of the login failures. For example, if a user makes only one keystroke error when
entering his password, then it seems likely that he has simply made a typographical error. On the
other hand, if the user makes the same one-character mistake several times in a short period, then it
is more likely that he has, in fact, forgotten the exact spelling of the password. Nonetheless, the Lscores would be 1 for each such login failure. In addition, the L-score formula does not take into
account the position of the keystroke error or its context in a word. For example, assume that
“hairball” is user1’s password and that user1 experiences two separate login failures when entering
“hairball\” and “hairballs” instead of the correct password. The L-scores for both mistakes would be 1;
5

Because many participants might never have used passphrases before, two examples were provided in the
instructions. The first example was “Ilovetosnowboard” and the second was “I love to snowboard”. The system
ensured that participants could not simply copy and paste either of the examples provided. In addition, the
“remember password” option was disabled during the course of our experiment.
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consequently, use of the rule that an L-score of 1 represents a typing error would categorize both
mistakes as typographical errors. The two errors, however, are actually quite different. The “\”
character is just above the enter key and, therefore, may conceivably have been pressed by accident.
In contrast, the letter “s” is not next to either the letter “l” or the enter key and, consequently, more
likely reflects a memory error (i.e., the user forgot whether the password was singular or plural).
Large L-scores are also potentially problematic. A large L-score can represent a memory error, in
which the user entered the wrong credential for that system. On the other hand, it could also result
from accidentally pressing the “Caps Lock” key, instead of the shift key when typing the first character
of the login credential.
Examination of the sequence of login attempts, however, can often provide clues about the cause of a
login failure. For example, entering a different password after experiencing a login failure suggests
that the preceding login failure was due to a memory error (i.e., the user forgot which password to use
on this system). Similarly, responding to a failed login attempt by re-entering the same password but
typing it correctly is evidence that the previous failure represented a typing error.
The preceding examples demonstrate why it is necessary to use subjective judgment in combination
with an objective measure like an L-score in order to classify the cause of a login failure. Therefore,
we asked two judges (neither of whom was aware of the hypotheses being tested) to use both Lscores and information about the login context to determine the cause of login failures. These judges
were given a list of every login failure, including the user identification number, that user’s correct
password or passphrase, incorrect credential entered, L-score, and a timestamp so that they could
take into account both the context and sequences of login attempts. In addition, we explained the Lscoring technique to them.
The judges individually categorized each login failure and recorded the reasons for their decisions.
The two judges then met and compared their individual assessments. They agreed on 92.3 percent of
the 351 login failures. The Kappa coefficient is 0.775 (p < 0.001), indicating that their agreement rate
was significantly greater than chance. The judges discussed the cases where they disagreed with
each other and reached agreement on how to categorize every such login failure. We used the
consensus classification identified for each login failure as the dependent variable.

User Perceptions and Intentions
We measured user perceptions and intentions by administering a survey on the last day of class.
Each survey item was based on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 to 7 (1 = strongly disagree, 7 =
strongly agree). Items measuring ease-of-use and usefulness were based on the dimensions used by
Adams et al. (1992), with modifications for the password context. We also included single item to
measure intent to adopt (see Appendix A for the list of survey items).

4. Experimental Results
Of the 58 undergraduate students who began the experiment, five (two from each password group
and one from the passphrase group) dropped the class during the first five weeks. In addition, we
removed one subject from the passphrase group who did not follow the generation guidelines to
generate a three of five word phrase from the final analysis, resulting in a sample size of 52
individuals. This resulted in 18 participants in the standard password group, and 17 participants each
in the random and passphrase treatments.
Over the course of the semester, the participants attempted 1,540 logins (of which 351 were
unsuccessful) to the class website, resulting in an average of almost 30 attempts per individual.
Although a minimum of only eight successful attempts were required to retrieve the eight homework
assignments, the additional login attempts were a result of both login failures and a desire to access
the additional web development resources available on the site.
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4.1. Demographics and Descriptive Data
Thirty-eight of the 52 participants were male. Forty-two participants were native United States
Citizens. Thirty participants were students from the school of business where the web development
course was offered, and the remainder came from the schools of fine arts, liberal arts and sciences,
and engineering. Of those participants who chose to report their academic standing, there was one
freshman, two sophomores, 19 juniors, 23 seniors, and four graduate students. The average
participant age was nearly 24, with a range from 17 to 43.
Table 2 contains descriptive information concerning the authentication credentials for these 52
participants. The passphrase group’s credential averaged 18.2 characters in length (and 3.63 words)
compared with 9.7 and 8 characters for the standard and random password groups, respectively. The
average character base is determined by the presence of lowercase letters, uppercase letters,
numbers, and non-letters in the password. For example, a password consisting of only lowercase
letters has a character base of 26; one containing both uppercase and lowercase letters has a
character base of 52; one that is case sensitive and includes numbers has a character base of 62;
and one that used all keyboard characters on a standard QWERTY keyboard has a character base of
95.6
Table 2. Password and Passphrase Descriptive Data
Group
1.
Standard
Password
2.
Random
Password
3. Passphrase

1.
Standard
Password
2.
Random
Password
3. Passphrase

Group
size

Ave.
length

S.D. of
length

Ave. char.
base

# of possible combinations

18

9.7

1.52

37.1

2.4E+15

17

8.0

0.00

88.0

3.6E+15

31.0

9.9E+26

Ave. # of
spaces

Ave. # of non-alphanumeric
characters excluding spaces

17
18.2
1.69
Ave. # of Ave. # of
lowercas uppercas Ave. # of
e letters e letters numbers
6.9

0.0

2.7

0.0

0.2

2.3

2.9

0.8

0.0

2.0

16.3

0.2

0.6

2.0

0.0

Table 2 also shows that user-generated passwords were more likely to contain numbers than special
characters. Passphrases, however, seldom included numbers or any special characters other than
spaces. We ran a popular password-cracking program called “Ophcrack” for two hours against a
Windows Vista password hash dump file of the login credentials used in this experiment to evaluate
their relative strength. We were able to crack 16 of the 18 user-generated passwords, one of the
system-generated random passwords, but none of the passphrases.7
As a manipulation check, the user perceptions survey administered at the conclusion of the
experiment included an item asking participants to indicate how similar this password or passphrase
was to any previous or current passwords they have used. Based on a Likert scale from 1-7 (1 = very
similar, 7 = very dissimilar), the standard, random, and passphrase groups reported means of 4.50,
6

It can be argued that the mere presence of non-alphanumeric characters does not indicate a “true” 95-character
base because the 10 characters associated with the number keys on a keyboard are used far more often than the
other 23 non-alphanumeric characters. While this may be true, the only two user-generated passwords in Table 2
that we classified as using the full 95-character set both used non-alphanumeric characters not associated with the
number keys.
7
As one anonymous reviewer noted, the failure to crack any passphrases may be an artifact of the design of most
current password cracking programs, which are limited to brute-force guessing of credentials that are less than 15
characters in length.
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6.57, and 6.63 respectively, indicating that each group considered their passwords to be different from
those they used in other settings.

4.2.. Login Performance
We performed an analysis of the differences in login performance between groups using one-way
ANOVAs with credential type as the independent variable and the participant’s login failure rates due
to memory and typographical errors as dependent variables. We used T-tests to compare the
hypothesized group differences8 whereas comparisons that were not hypothesized.
Overall (combining memory and typographical errors), the passphrase group experienced the lowest
login failure rate (10.98 percent), followed by the standard (20.32 percent) and random (30.15
percent) groups. Perhaps most interesting, four of the passphrase users never experienced a single
login failure, compared to only two of the standard password users and one of the random password
users.
The judges classified 299 of the 351 login failures as reflecting memory errors and 52 as representing
typographical errors (see Table 3 for group details). We performed multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) using Wilks’s lambda criterion to check for mean differences among the three groups
across memory and typographical error rates (See Appendix B for details). Results of the MANOVA
indicated that significant differences exist (F = 4.059, p = 0.004). Therefore, we performed
independent ANOVAs for each dependent variable (see the results in Appendix C).
Table 3. Descriptive Data of Login Attempts
TypoTotal
Successfu Memory graphical
Group
Attempts l Attempts
Errors
Errors
1.
Standard Mean
34.17
25.94
7.56
0.67
Password
Std. Dev.
13.23
8.62
9.50
0.91
2.
Random Mean
29.71
20.00
8.12
1.59
Password
Std. Dev.
11.85
8.14
6.57
1.18
3. Passphrase
Mean
24.71
22.47
1.47
0.76
Std. Dev.
12.68
11.73
1.33
1.15

Memory Errors
Figure 3 shows that the passphrase group experienced significantly fewer memory errors (7.80
percent) than either the standard group (18.22 percent, p = .017) or the random group (24.78 percent,
p < .001). Thus, H1a is supported. However, the standard and random groups did not differ
significantly in the number of login failures due to memory errors (p = .124). Thus, H1b is not
supported.

Typographical Errors
Hypothesis H2a predicts that users who created WPM-consistent passphrases would make fewer
typing errors than would users of either self-generated or system-generated random passwords. Four
participants created passphrases that were not consistent with WPM. Therefore, we tested H2a by
excluding those four participants from the analysis. Figure 4 shows that the typographical error rate
for the 13 passphrase users who created WPM-consistent passphrases was 2.34 percent, which was
significantly lower than the typing error rate for the random group (5.36 percent, t = 1.927, p = .032).
The difference in typing error rates between the passphrase and standard password groups, however,
was not significant (means of 2.34 percent vs. 2.11% percent t = 0.185, p = .854). Thus, H2a is only
partially supported.
8

Levene’s test was used to measure the homogeneity of variances and t-test adjustments. Only one pairwise
comparison did not pass the Levene test for the homogeneity of variances (p > .05); hence the corresponding t-test
for that comparison was performed assuming unequal variances.
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Figure 3: Average Rate of Memory Errors by Group

Figure 4: Average Rate of Typographical Errors by Group
Note: This graph and corresponding ANOVA does not include passphrase users who did not
conform to WPM

H2b predicts that the degree to which passphrases are WPM-consistent affects the likelihood of
making a typographical error. Sample size constraints prevented us from creating two passphrase
groups in this study. Therefore, to test H2b, we obtained the data from the passphrase group in Keith
et al.’s (2007) experiment. Their passphrase group received similar instructions with the exception
that their subjects were required to include at least one non-alphabetic character, one upper-case
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letter, and one lower-case letter. The two passphrase groups are of the same size (n = 17) and
created passphrases of similar length (means of 18.06 characters in that study vs. 18.12 characters
in this study, t = 0.065, p = 0.949).
To test H2b, we grouped the 34 individual passphrases created in both studies into those that
conformed to WPM (e.g., use of spaces, no alternative characters, etc.) and those that did not. This
classification resulted in 18 participants in the WPM group (13 from the current study and five from
Keith et al. (2007)) and 16 in the non-WPM group (four from the current study and 12 from Keith et al.
(2007)). The same judges who coded the cause of login errors for participants in this study followed
the same procedures to classify the cause of login errors in the data from Keith et al. (2007). Onetailed t-tests reveal that the typing error rate was lower for passphrases that were consistent with
WPM (3.19% vs. 8.29%, p = 0.019). Thus, H2b is supported.9 Figure 4 also shows that H2c is
supported: users of system-generated random passwords made significantly more typographical
errors than did users of self-generated passwords (5.36 percent vs. 2.11 percent, p =.007).
Collectively, the results of testing Hypotheses H2a-c indicate that users of WPM-consistent
credentials made fewer typographical errors than did users of credentials that were not WPMconsistent. To further examine this issue, we performed a regression analysis of the rate of
typographical errors as a function of the types of characters included in the login credential. The
analysis contained in Appendix D shows that the only factor significantly associated with the rate of
typographical errors was the inclusion of non-alphanumeric characters (other than spaces). This
provides additional evidence in support of the WPM effect. It also explains the results of testing
Hypotheses H2a-c: as shown in Table 2, system-generated random passwords included an average
of two such non-alphanumeric characters, but self-generated passwords (passphrases) seldom
(never) used any such characters.

4.3. User Perceptions
At the end of the project, participants completed the perceptions survey (shown in Appendix A) during
the final class period. Although the items were based on validated instruments, they were adjusted for
the specific context of passphrase usage. The three items measuring ease-of-use formed a reliable
construct (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.90). However, the item concerning credential “effectiveness” was
removed in order to achieve a reliable, four-item measure of usefulness (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.92).
Figure 5 displays the differences between groups on all three perception measures: ease-of-use,
usefulness, and intent to adopt.
Hypothesis H3 predicts that overall login failure rates will affect user perceptions of usefulness and
ease-of-use. To test these hypotheses, we formulated a partial least squares (PLS) model using
SmartPLS (Ringle et al., 2005). Figure 6 displays the PLS model, which confirms H3 that the rate of
overall login failures is inversely related to both ease-of-use (β = -0.29, p < 0.01) and usefulness (β =
-0.14, p < 0.05).
Hypothesis H4 predicts that user perceptions will affect their intent to voluntarily adopt a particular
type of login credential for use on other systems. In addition, prior research on technology
acceptance has demonstrated that perceived usefulness also mediates the relationship between
perceived ease-of-use and the intention to adopt (Venkatesh and Davis, 1996). The PLS model
confirmed that perceived ease-of-use is a significant indicator of perceived usefulness (β = 0.77, p <
0.001) and that perceived usefulness is positively related to a participant’s intention to adopt his or
her login credential (β = 0.58, p < 0.001). However, the coefficient for the relationship between
perceived ease-of-use and intention to adopt was not significant. This result is not surprising,
because prior research has often demonstrated that usefulness is the stronger predictor of a user’s
intention to adopt because of the mediating effect of usefulness10 (Taylor and Todd, 1995; Venkatesh
and Davis, 1996; 2000).
9

There was no difference in the rates of memory errors associated with the two types of passphrases (13.44 percent
for the WPM vs. 10.10 percent for the non-WPM groups, p = 0.547). This is consistent with arguments that any
amount of meaningfully related information can be represented as a single chunk (Simon, 1974).
10
However, it is possible that this study simply did not have a large enough sample size to detect the small effect of
perceived ease of use on intent to adopt.
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Figure 5: Average User Perceptions by Group

Figure 6: PLS Model Testing H3 and H4

5. Discussion
Table 5 summarizes our findings. As predicted, passphrases are easier to remember (i.e., resulted in
fewer login failures due to memory errors) than either user-generated standard passwords or systemgenerated random passwords. Contrary to prior research (cf Yan et al., 2004), we did not find that
user-generated passwords were easier to remember than system-generated random passwords, but
they did result in fewer login failures due to typographical errors. The hypotheses concerning the
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effect of WPM on typographical errors were mostly supported. Users of system-generated random
passwords, which contained not only alphanumeric but also other special characters, experienced
more login failures due to typographic errors than did users of standard passwords or users of WPMconsistent passphrases. In addition, users of WPM-consistent passphrases experienced fewer login
failures due to typographical errors than did users of passphrases that were not WPM-consistent.
There was, however, no difference in frequency of typographical errors between passphrases and
standard passwords. As anticipated, user perceptions were more favorable when they did not
encounter problems logging in. The relative level of participants’ perceptions was directly related to
their overall login failure rates, with passphrase users having the most favorable perceptions and
random password users reporting the least favorable perceptions. Finally, user perceptions about
usefulness were positively related to their expressed intention to voluntarily adopt that type of
credential to authenticate themselves to other systems.
Table 5. Summary of Research Findings
Behavioral Effects
H1a: Users of passphrases will experience fewer login failures due to memory
errors than will users of either self-generated passwords or system-generated
random passwords.
H1b: Users of self-generated passwords will experience fewer login failures
due to memory errors than will users of system-generated random passwords.
H2a: Users who create passphrases that conform to word processing mode
(WPM) will experience fewer typing errors than will users of either system- or
self-generated passwords.
H2b: Users who create passphrases that conform to WPM will experience
fewer typing errors than will users who create passphrases that are not
consistent with WPM.
H2c: Users of system-generated random passwords will experience more
typing errors than will users who generate their own passwords.
Psychological Effects
H3: Overall login failure rates will be inversely related to perceptions about the
ease-of-use and usefulness of login credentials.
H4: User perceptions about the ease-of-use and usefulness of a login
credential increase their intentions to voluntarily adopt that type of credential
for use in authenticating to other systems.

Supported
Not
Supported
Partially
Supported
Supported
Supported

Supported
Supported

5.1. Limitations
Before discussing the implications of our findings, it is important to consider the limitations of this
study. First, we conducted a controlled experiment with college students as participants. Controlled
experiments increase internal validity, but raise questions about external validity. Thus, it is possible
that our participants’ behavior may not generalize to that of employees in a work setting. One
difference concerns frequency of logins. Employees must log in at least once each day, and
sometimes more often (e.g., if password-protected screen savers are used or if policies require
logging out prior to extended breaks). In contrast, participants in our study only needed to log in
periodically, perhaps as infrequently as once per week. However, participants in our study were
required to use their authentication credentials in a meaningful setting to perform a task for which
there were non-trivial rewards (i.e., they could only complete the assigned homework by successfully
logging in to the course website). Moreover, we measured actual login behavior, rather than tested
responses to hypothetical situations.
A second limitation is that the length of our experiment was too short to study the effects of mandatory
password changes across different types of authentication credentials. Therefore, our results may
only be representative of the initial use of passphrases as an authentication credential. However, this
study did utilize a long enough time period to reliably measure whether users can remember and
correctly enter long passphrases, and hence it represents a significant step forward from the short-
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term and cross-sectional tests used in most prior password research. Nevertheless, future research is
needed to determine how difficult it is to generate new passphrases, and how a mandatory
requirement to periodically change passphrases affects subsequent login failure rates and user
perceptions.

5.2. Implications
The findings of this study have a number of important implications for practice and research.

Practice
In recent years security practitioners have begun advocating the use of passphrases over passwords.
One argument in favor of passphrases is that they are easier to remember (cf Johansson and Riley,
2005, p. 338). Our finding that passphrase users experienced fewer login failures due to memory
errors supports that argument. This suggests that switching to passphrases may improve security by
reducing users’ inclination to write them down, thus ensuring that the credential remains “something
they know.” Our finding that passphrase users made significantly fewer typographical errors than did
users of system-generated random passwords also supports practitioners’ arguments that it should be
easier to correctly type passphrases than complex passwords that include special non-alphanumeric
characters other than spaces (cf Skoudis and Liston, 2006, p. 402).
Our results also suggest that passphrase design is important. Specifically, users of WPM-consistent
passphrases made fewer typographical errors than did users who created passphrases that were not
consistent with WPM. This finding suggests that IT managers may wish to strongly encourage users
to create passphrases that are WPM-consistent so as to help reduce login failures due to
typographical errors. The ease of typing WPM-consistent passphrases has additional implications for
IT managers who desire to increase the resistance of passphrases to brute-force attacks by including
numbers and special characters. Our findings suggest that this intent will be easier to achieve and
more successful if users choose symbols normally used in word processing (e.g., commas, periods,
quotes, exclamation points, question marks, etc.). In addition, numbers are more likely to be correctly
entered if they represent dates, quantities, or ages. Thus, our results suggest that it is better to use
passphrases verbatim than to create a password consisting of the first letter of each word in the
phrase because, in most cases, the resulting password will not conform to standard spelling rules.
A potential problem with adopting passphrase policies is that users may tend to generate
passphrases consisting of only a small number of words. If we accept conservative estimates that the
average person’s vocabulary consists of approximately 3,000 words, then the potential search space
for passphrases that consist of four words is actually smaller and, therefore, easier to “guess” through
brute-force enumeration, than the search space for eight-character alphanumeric, case-sensitive
passwords. On the other hand, five-word passphrases drawn from a 3,000 word vocabulary have a
search space that is larger than that for system-generated random passwords that contain not only
alphanumeric but also special characters (30005 > 958), and an eight-word passphrase constructed
from such a vocabulary has a search space comparable to that of a 14-character system-generated
random password (30008 ~ 9514). Thus, IT managers contemplating the use of passphrases may wish
to establish a minimum requirement that passphrases consist of at least five words.

Research
Our results suggest a number of promising avenues for further research. One important topic
concerns identifying the reasons why passphrases are easier to remember than user-generated
passwords. The concepts of chunking and phonological similarity provide competing explanations of
this phenomenon. On the one hand, a passphrase, regardless of length, may be easy to memorize
because it can be represented as one chunk. In contrast, a user-generated password that conforms
to complexity requirements may be represented as multiple chunks: one for the base word, and one
for each substitution of a number or special character for a letter. Thus, the password $3cur!ty may
consist of four chunks (i.e., security, $, 3, and !). On the other hand, psychology research has found
that recall accuracy is inversely related to the degree to which the target item is phonologically similar
to other items stored in memory (Baddeley, 1966, Conrad, 1964; Lian et al., 2001). Thus, our finding
that passphrases are easier to remember may merely reflect their novelty and may disappear over
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time as they become more widely used. Only future research can disentangle these alternative
explanations.
We did not find a significant difference in typing errors between passphrases and user-generated
passwords, even though the latter were not WPM-consistent when they included at least one nonalphabetic character. However, users of self-generated passwords rated their passwords as being
more similar to the credentials they used on other systems than did passphrase users (4.50 vs. 6.63
on a 7-point Likert scale, p=0.002). This means that users of self-generated passwords in our study
had prior practice in typing passwords that were not WPM-consistent. Practice improves the
performance of cognitive, perceptual, and motor tasks, assuming that individuals are motivated and
receive immediate feedback (Ericsson et al., 1993). Users in our study were motivated to successfully
log in as they were trying to access course materials, and they received immediate feedback
concerning that endeavor. Thus, with practice, users may become proficient in typing short passwords
that are not WPM-consistent. Nevertheless, while typing error rates in both this study and Keith et al.
(2007) declined over time during the course of the experiment, the groups that initially experienced
the highest typing error rates formed the most unfavorable perceptions. Thus, further research
investigating the effects of password and passphrase composition on typing errors is warranted.
Our finding that WPM-consistent passphrases were less prone to typing errors than non-compliant
passphrases has implications for the potential strength of passphrases. Current password cracking
programs focus on manipulating individual characters in the credential, and those character
manipulation techniques are not optimized for cracking passphrases. Information security like national
defense, however, is an ongoing process of continual innovation both offensively and defensively. As
passphrases become more widely used, brute-force methods for attacking them are also likely to
evolve to focus on manipulating words rather than individual characters, thus significantly weakening
the potential strength of passphrases. Obvious countermeasures include deliberately misspelling
words in the phrase or replacing some individual letters with numbers or other special characters. Our
results suggest, however, that either strategy is likely to increase login failures due to typing errors.
Therefore, additional research identifying ways to increase passphrase strength without sacrificing
usability is needed.

6. Conclusion
Passphrases, like all authentication credentials, are artifacts. It is important for IS researchers to
carefully examine and rigorously demonstrate the utility of such artifacts (Hevner et al., 2004). This
paper does so by showing how technical features (e.g., password composition requirements) and
reactive behaviors (e.g., memory and typing errors) are so intertwined that focusing on one side of
the issue but ignoring the other leads to incomplete, or even erroneous, conclusions. Our results
suggest that passphrases do enhance the usability of including “something you know” as an
authentication credential. Nevertheless, additional questions remain to be answered by future
research.
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Appendix A: Survey Items
Likert Scale 1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 = Strongly Agree
Similarity
1. The password or passphrase I used for the [experiment]11 is quite similar to
others I have used in the past or are currently using.
Ease of Use
2. It would be easy for me to remember passwords like the one I used for [the
experiment] as a login credential on other restricted sites that I regularly access.
3. It would be easy for me to correctly enter passwords like the one I created for
[the experiment] as a login credential on other restricted sites that I regularly
access.
4. It would be easy for me to become skillful at generating passwords in the
format I used for [the experiment] (i.e. length, character set, and composition) as
a login credential on other restricted sites that I regularly access.
Usefulness
5. I can enter passwords during routine logins more quickly by using the format of
my [experiment] password (i.e. length and character set, and composition).
6. The password I created for [the experiment] would be very difficult for an
unauthorized user to crack or discover.
7. Using a password format like the one I used for [the experiment] would help
reduce my need for password reminders or changes.
8. I would not need to write down or store my passwords as much if I always
used a password format (i.e. length and character set, and composition) like the
one I used for [the experiment]
9. I could remember more passwords at once if I always used a password format
(i.e. length, character set, composition) like the one I used for [the experiment]
Intent to
10. I intend to use the same password format I used for [the experiment] (i.e.
Adopt
length, character set, and composition) in the future to create passwords to login
to other systems.

11

85

In the survey instrument the course name appeared in place of the phrase [the experiment]
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Appendix B: MANOVA Results on the Effect of Credential Type on
Memory and Typographical Error Rates
Multivariate Tests

Effect
Intercept

CredTyp
e

Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's
Largest
Root
Pillai's Trace

Value
F
.683 51.605
.317 51.605
2.150 51.605

Hyp.
df
2.000
2.000
2.000

Error df
48.000
48.000
48.000

Sig.
.000
.000
.000

Partial
Eta
Square
d
.683
.683
.683

2.150 51.605

2.000

48.000

.000

.683

1.000

Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's
Largest
Root

Power
1.000
1.000
1.000

.282

4.026

4.000

98.000

.005

.141

.899

.732
.348

4.059
4.087

4.000
4.000

96.000
94.000

.004
.004

.145
.148

.901
.903

.280

6.855

2.000

49.000

.002

.219

.905

Sig.

Partial
Eta
Squared

Power

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source
Corrected
Model

Intercept

Credentia
l Type

Error

Total

Corrected
Total

Dependent Variable
Rate of Memory
Errors
Rate of Typo Errors
Rate of Memory
Errors
Rate of Typo Errors
Rate of Memory
Errors
Rate of Typo Errors
Rate of Memory
Errors
Rate of Typo Errors
Rate of Memory
Errors
Rate of Typo Errors
Rate of Memory
Errors
Rate of Typo Errors

Type III
Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squar
e

df

F

.250

2

.125

5.868

.005

.193

.854

.010

2

.005

2.756

.073

.101

.519

1.490

1

1.490 70.062

.000

.588

1.000

.066

1

.066 37.791

.000

.435

1.000

.250

2

.125

5.868

.005

.193

.854

.010

2

.005

2.756

.073

.101

.519

1.042

49

.021

.085

49

.002

2.787

52

.159

52

1.292

51

.095

51
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Appendix C: ANOVAs Comparing Credential Types
One-way ANOVA testing the effects of credential type on memory errors

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of
squares

df

0.250
1.042
1.292

2
49
51

Mean
square
0.125
0.021

F

Significance

Partial
Eta2

Power
(α = .05)

5.868

0.005

0.193

0.854

Cell means for memory errors by credential type
95% Confidence Interval

Credential
Type

Mean

Std. Error

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

Standard
Random
Passphrase

.182
.248
.078

.034
.035
.035

.113
.177
.007

.251
.319
.149

One-way ANOVA testing the effects of credential type on typographical errors
Sum of
Mean
Partial Power
squares
df
square
F
Significance
Eta2 (α = .05)
Between Groups
0.011
2
0.005
3.816
0.029
0.145
0.664
Within Groups
0.065
45
0.001
Total
0.076
47

Cell means for typographical errors by credential type

87

95% Confidence Interval

Credential
Type

Mean

Std. Error

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

Standard
Random
Passphrase

.021
.054
.032

.010
.010
.010

.001
.033
.012

.041
.074
.052
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Appendix D: Regression Models Predicting Typographical Errors
Linear regression was used to further understand the effects of password length and specific
character types on typographical errors. The results indicate that password and passphrase length
did not explain any of the variance in typo errors in this study. Neither did the amount of uppercase
letters or numbers. However, the inclusion of non-alphanumeric characters (e.g., #, @, and &) did
have a significant effect on the rate of typo errors (p < .001). None of the passphrases used these
characters, but they did appear in all but one of the system-generated passwords and also in two of
the user-created passwords. The resulting credential is not WPM-consistent, which may account for
the fact that the random group had the highest rate of typing errors, as predicted by the rationale
underlying H2a and H2b.
Regression Model
Typographical Errors

Estimates

Independent Variable
Password Length
Rate of 'Other Characters'
Rate
of
Letters

Model
0.001
(0.764)
0.168***
(3.419)

Uppercase

Rate of Numbers

N
R-squared
F-statistic

for

-0.026
(-0.580)
-0.001
(-0.033)
52
0.256
4.043

Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses below coefficients.* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
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